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THE TRADE ACT OF 1974: COPING WITH UNEQUAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL COSTS
SCOTT C. WHITNEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has recently established an institutional framework to
be employed in formulating and implementing international trade
policy. On January 3, 1975, President Ford signed into law the
Trade Act of 1974, 1
 which was enacted by Congress under its
plenary constitutional authority to "lay and collect taxes, duties,.
imposts" and "to regulate commerce with foreign nations." 2 Despite
its constitutional power in these areas, since 1934 Congress has
periodically delegated to the President specific and limited trade
agreement power to negotiate reciprocal tariff and trade concessions
with foreign nations. 3 Until the passage of the Trade Act of 1974,
the most recent congressional delegation of authority to the Presi-
dent to negotiate trade agreements was the Trade Expansion Act of
1962. 4 The President's authority under this Act terminated June 30,
1967 and since that date the President has been without negotiating
authority.' The proposed Trade Act of 1970, 6 which Congress failed
to enact, was the last legislative attempt to address the trade policy
of the United States ,prior to the Trade Act of 1974.
In the interval since the last foreign trade legislation enacted by
Congress in 1962, the economies of the world and of the United
States have experienced radical changes. The extent and magnitude
of these changes made it clear that United States trade policy was
overdue for a reevaluation. In particular, the increasing importance
of certain "nontariff barriers" or "distortions" called for special
consideration. Foremost among these distortions were those which
have arisen as a result of the increased costs of production caused by
the pollution abatement and other environmental costs incurred by
United States industry. These costs have also been incurred, to a
lesser degree, by the industries of our foreign trade partners, espe-
cially the highly developed industrial nations.
The purpose of this article is to focus on the domestic
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law; A.B.,'
Univ, of Nevada, 1949; ID., Harvard, 1952.
Pub, L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (Jan. 3, 1975).
2 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
3 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970), as amended.
19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1970).
5
 Although the President's authority to negotiate and enter into new trade agreements
expired in 1967, 19 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1970), his authority to take retaliatory action against
discriminatory trade practices of a foreign government remained unimpaired. See S. Rep. No.
1431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1970).
6
 H.R. No. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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decision-making structures needed to cope with complex and emerg-
ing world economic conditions and distortions in international trade
competition arising from unevenly incurred environmental control
costs. Initially, the current economic trends necessitating revision of
the United States' international trade decision-making structure will
be reviewed. The impact of environmental control costs upon the
United States' trade position will then be analyzed. Finally, the
provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 will be discussed in order to
provide the basis for an evaluation of the adequacy of the United
States' international trade policy-making and decision-making struc-
ture to cope with economic distortions resulting from programs such
as pollution abatement.
Congress recognized the problem of unevenly incurred en-
vironmental abatement costs in 1972 and mandated an extensive
and continuing study by the Department of Commerce to determine,
among other things: (1) the short and long term effects of pollution
abatement programs upon production costs and market prices of
domestic manufacturers on an industry-by-industry basis; (2) a cor-
responding analysis with respect to foreign industrial nations; (3) the
advantage gained by a foreign nation where it fails to require its
manufacturers to implement comparable programs or in some way
reimburses or subsidizes such programs; (4) ways to equalize any
advantage that a foreign competitor may derive from the failure of
its government to require pollution controls comparable to those of
the United States.'
The first two reports of the Secretary of Commerce prepared
under this mandate have now been published.K Although these
reports contain some important advances in the difficult matter of
ascertaining the extent of the impact of environmental costs upon
foreign trade, they fall far short of reaching even tentative conclu-
sions. However, the reports do acknowledge that the cost of en-
vironmental requirements "will have significant economic conse-
quences" and substantially affect the United States trade position. 9
II. THE SETTING: RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS AFFECTING
U.S. FOREIGN TRADE
In 1974, as Congress undertook to consider what provisions to
enact to produce an adequate trade reform bill, it faced a complex
7 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendements of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 6,
86 Stat. 897 (Oct. 18, 1972), codified in a note following 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II, 1972).
For the full text of § 6, see note 24 infra.
° U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Thie Effects of Pollution Abatement on International Trade,
vol. I (1973) & vol. II (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pollution Abatement and International
Trade].
9 I Pollution Abatement and International Trade, supra note 8, at 16.
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array of new economic forces unlike those that confronted the Con-
gress which debated and enacted the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
These new forces necessitated a major reconsideration of the con-
ventional techniques of formulating and applying a viable trade
policy.
A primary factor is that United States imports of merchandise
have increased in the past decade—from $18.7 billion in 1964 to
$69.1 billion in 1973—nearly a four-fold increase.'° This trend will
undoubtedly become accentuated because of an increased depen-
dence on foreign oil and because of the recent exorbitant price
increases imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). The Department of Interior forecast of supply
and demand for oil in the United States for the remainder of the
century supports this prediction:
TABLE 1 11
TRILLIONS OF BTU
1971 1975 1980 1985 2000
Domestic Supply 22,569 22,130 23,770 23,600 21,220
Percent of Total 74.0 63.1 56.3 46.6 29.7
Supplemental Supplies 7,923 12,960 18,420 27,100 50,160
Percent of Total 26.0 36.9 43,7 53.4 70.3
Total 30,492 35,090 42,190 50,700 71,380
Regardless of the precise accuracy of such forecasts, it is clear
that even assuming developments such as the success of major
conservation efforts, resort to alternative energy sources, increased
exploration and production of petroleum (for example development
of the outer continental shelf reserves), and increased refinery capac-
ity, a significant shortage in the supply of petroleum and petroleum
products will remain. This continuing problem was reflected in
presidential announcements of a national commitment to "Project
Independence,"" a program intended to achieve national energy
self-sufficiency at the earliest possible date." However, one Project
Independence study recognized that at best, "1985 is the earliest
date by which self-sufficiency can reasonably be expected with this
Staff of Senate Comm, on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Staff Data and Materials on
U.S. Trade and Balance of Payments 1 (Feb. 26, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Comm.
Staff Data].
11 U.S. Dept of Interior, United States Energy Through the Year 2000, at 10 (1972).
12 Former President Nixon outlined in detail his proposed Project Independence in a
special message to Congress on the Energy Crisis. The text of this message appears in 120
Cong. Rec. H 151 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1974).
13 See, e.g., Atomic Energy Comm'n, The Nation's Energy Future vii (1973) (report
submitted to President Richard M. Nixon by D.L. Ray, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n).
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program," and that at best, United States dependence on oil imports
could only be reduced by half (to 6 million barrels per day) by
1980." This study also recognized that these objectives could be
attained only if the complete recommended "Project Independence"
program was adopted in time for Fiscal Year 1975 budgeting and
was sustained over the next decade and beyond, a remote likeli-
hood. ' 5
 Thus, the problem of dependence upon foreign sources of oil
is likely to continue to have great impact upon the United States'
balance of payments. Since 1966 the United States has incurred
annual deficits in both trade and balance of payments, with the
exception of 1973, when a modest surplus in the balance of pay-
ments was achieved because of unusually large sales of agricultural
products. 16
This decade also •saw a severe, unprecedented overheating of
the U.S. economy which greatly intensified upward pressures on
domestic wages and prices. Increasing wages and prices of
domestically-produced commodities injured their ability to compete
with commodities produced abroad. The chart on the following
page demonstrates the significantly higher increase in unit labor cost
in manufacturing incurred by the United States as compared to that
of its nine leading industrial trading partners.''
In terms of impairing the ability of domestically-produced
commodities to compete with foreign commodities, perhaps the most
ominous of all the recent economic trends is the decline in the
growth rate of productivity in the United States during the past
decade. Table II demonstrates this decline."
The repercussions of these developments have been significant. Al-
though domestic wages have, in recent decades at least, been higher
than those of other countries, until quite recently the impact of this
factor upon the competitive position of domestic industry in interna-
tional trade has been offset by the higher productivity of the Ameri-
can worker. This was demonstrated as recently as 1960-64, during
which period the United States still exported more than it im-
,ported.' 9
H Id.
15
 Id. At this time there is little evidence that the Project Independence study will
become an "action" paper.
16
 See Senate Comm. Staff Data, supra note 10, at 1, 8.
' 7
 This chart is reprinted from volume 1 of compendium of Papers submitted to the
Comm'n on Intl Trade and Investment Policy, United States International Policy in an
Interdependent World 539 (1971) (hereinafter cited as CITIP Study].
18
 This table, which is based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, appears in 1 CITIP Study, supra note 17, at 545.
Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Tables and Statistical Material on
U.S. Balance of Trade and Balance of Payments 1 (Dec. 1974).
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1960
	
1962
	
1964
	
1966	 1968	 1970
NOTE: Data for trading partners are weighted according to U.S. Imports from each
country In 1965. Data for Europe pertain to Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland (wage earners only), and the United Kingdom.
TABLE II
AVERAGE PERCENT CHANGE IN OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR FOR MANUFACTURING EMPLOYEES
Country 1960-65 1965-69 1969.70
United States 4,3 2.1 1
Belgium 5.4 8.6 11.7*
Canada 3.7 4.1 3
France 4.8 7,0 9
Germany 6.0 5.7 4
Italy 7.1 3.7 1.2*
Japan 8.2 15.1 13
Netherlands 6.4 8.4 12
Sweden 5.9 8.2 6
United Kingdom 3.4 4,0 3
Switzerland 3.1 7.2 5
Not available for 1969-70; 1968-69 data used instead.
To date American financial policymakers have been unable to
arrest the problems created by the interaction of increased domestic
prices, increased wage levels, and declining worker productivity.
120
110
100
90
80
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The result has been an acceleration of the trend toward greater
imports, a trend which is evident from the data in Table 111. 2 °
TABLE III
U.S. TRADE AND BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICITS
[In billions of dollars]
U.S. Trade Position Trade Balance 
Exports (X) Imports (M)
F.O.B.
C.I.F. (M)
Excluding
Foreign
Aid (X)
Balance of Payments
Total
Minus
Foreign
Aid F.O.B. C.I.F.'
Official
Settle-	 Basic
Liquidity2	ments2	Balance
1960 19.6 17.9 15.1 16.3 4.5 1.6 - 3.7 - 3.4
1961 20.2 18.3 14.7 16.0 5.5 2.3 - 2.3 -	 1.3
1962
1963
21.0
22.5
18.7
19.9
16.5
17.2
17.8
18.6
4.5
5.3
0.9
1.3
- 2.9
-	 2.7
- 2.7
-	 1.9 -0.83
1964 25.8 23.1 18.7 20.3 7.1 2.8 - 2.7 -	 1.5
1965 26.7 24.3 21.5 23.2 5.2 1.1 - 2.5 -	 1.3
1966 29.5 27.0 25.6 27.7 3.9 - 0.7 - 2.2 .2 -1.7
1967 31.0 28.5 26.9 28.8 4.1 -	 .3 - 4.7 - 3.4 -3.3
1968 34.1 31.8 33.2 35.3 .9 - 3.5 -	 1.6 -	 1.6 -1.4
1969 37.3 35.3 36.0 38.2 1.3 - 2.9 - 6.1 '	 2.7 -3.0
1970 42.7 40.7 40.0 42.4 2.7 -	 1.7 - 4.7 -10.7 -3.0
1971 43.5 41.7 45.6 48.3 -2.1 - 6.6 -22.7 -30.5 -9.6
1972 49.2 47.5 55.6 58.9 -6.4 -11.4 -14.7 -11.1 -9.8
19734 70.8 69.4 69.1 73.2 +1.7 - 3.8 - 7.9 - 5.3 +1.7
1
 C.I.F. imports for the years 1960.66 are assumed to be roughly equivalent to 108.3% of
f.o.b. imports in accordance with a Bureau of Customs-Tariff Commission-Bureau of
Census study based on 1966 arrivals. For the years 1967-73 estimates are based on Bureau of
Customs-Bureau of Census studies showing estimated freight and insurance charges to be 6.9
percent (1967), 6.3 percent (1968), 6.1 percent (1969), 6.2 percent (1970), 6.1 percent (1971),
and 5.9 percent for 1972 and 1973.
2
 The liquidity and official settlements deficits for 1966-73 excludes SDR allocations.
3
 Annual average.
4
 Estimated on basis of partial data.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
The effect of prolonged trade and balance of payments deficits
upon the value of United States currency has been adverse. Recent
inflationary developments contributed to staggering balance of trade
and payments deficits between 1970 and 1972 and produced massive
runs against the dollar. As a result, the United States became unable
to maintain a fixed parity between the dollar and gold, and the fixed
exchange rate structure collapsed on August 15, 1971. 21 Sub-
sequently, there occurred several dollar devaluations, which further
intensified the inflationary pressures on the U.S. economy. Devalua-
tion makes imports more expensive for domestic consumers and
domestically-produced exports relatively less expensive for foreign
20
 Reprinted from Senate Comm. Staff Data, supra note 10, at
2 ' Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong,, 2d Sess., Summary and Analysis of H.R.
10710 at 3 (Feb. 26, 1974).
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consumers. Thus domestic prices for imports into the United States
experience price increases. This in turn may trigger demands for
higher wages so that a vicious wage-price cycle may be set in
motion. Correspondingly, the increase in exports which resulted
from the dollar devaluations have tended to create domestic re-
source or commodity shortages. These shortages in turn have
created further pressure for domestic price increases and, in some
instances, necessitate the imposition of export controls which con-
travene one of the primary purposes of devaluation, i.e., the rever-
sal of unfavorable trade and payments balances. The adverse im-
pact of this situation upon the value of U.S. currency is clear. The
charts on the following page demonstrate the international position
of United States currency. 22
This factual presentation demonstrates that developments in
international and domestic economic conditions have substantially
contributed to the worsening competitive position of domestic busi-
ness. This result requires a focus on one of its specific causes—
environmental control cost distortions, which are nontariff barriers
to foreign marketing of domestic commodities.
III. DISTORTIONS ARISING FROM ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL COSTS
The need to cope with the problems of inflation, declining
worker productivity, continuing national budget deficits, prolonged
disequilibria in balance of trade and payments, and the unfavorable
rate of exchange between United States currency and that of its
major trading partners is apparent. All of these necessary policy
objectives are inextricably related to inflation, the abatement of
which has recently been designated as the top national priority by
President Ford in his Economic Address to a joint session of the
Congress. 23 Clearly, trade reform legislation is an important element
in the total program to control inflation and stabilize the national
economy.
Until comparatively recently, however, the extent to which
these adverse economic forces are aggravated by both short and long
term environmental costs was not widely recognized. These costs
may be defined as the additional costs incurred by producers of any
commodity or service, as a result of environmental regulation. Ex-
pressed in terms of classical economics, federal, state and local
environmental reform and planning legislation and implementing
regulations, especially those imposed since 1969, have set in motion
22
 The charts are reprinted from Senate Comm. Staff Data, supra note 10, at 46.
2.i
	
Cong. Rec. H. 10, l20 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974).
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Major US Trading Partners: Exchange Rates Relative to the US Dollar
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United Kingdom
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US: Effective Rate of Exchange of the US Dollar
1966 = 100
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France
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* The indexes are based on the central rates except In periods of currency float
where the values shown are market rates.
** Derived from weights based on overall U.S. trade during 1972.
SOURCE: Council on International Economic Policy Annual Report, February 1974.
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an economic process whereby environmental externalities are being
converted into costs of production, and therefore, introduced into
the nation's price structure. Thus, there results not only domestic
price increases, but also, as Congress has recognized, a substantial
impact upon the foreign trade posture of the United States.
A. Measuring Environmental Control Costs
As a result of its recognition of the influence of domestic en-
vironmental costs upon U.S. foreign trade, Congress directed the
Secretary of Commerce, in section 6 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 24 to study the matter. The cen-
tral task imposed by section 6 is the identification and quantification
of costs incurred by domestic and foreign manufacturers in the
course of compliance with environmental laws and regulations. To
24
 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 6, codified in a note
following 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II, 1972), provides:
(a) The Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with other interested Federal Agen-
cies and with representatives of industry and the public, shall undertake im-
mediately an investigation and study to determine—
(1) the extent to which pollution abatement and control programs will be
imposed on, or voluntarily undertaken by, United States manufacturers in the
near future and the probable short- and long-range effects of the costs of such
programs (computed to the greatest extent practicable on an industry-by-
industry basis) on (A) the production costs of such domestic manufacturers, and
(B) the market prices of the goods produced by them;
(2) the probable extent to which pollution abatement and control programs will
be implemented in foreign industrial nations in the near future and the extent to
which the production casts (computed to the greatest extent practicable on an
industry-by-industry basis) of foreign manufacturers will be affected by the costs
of such programs;
(3) the probable competitive advantage which any article manufactured in a
foreign nation will likely have in relation to a comparable article made in the
United States if that foreign nation—
(A) does not require its manufacturers to implement pollution abatement
and control programs,
(B) requires a lesser degree of pollution abatement and control in its
programs, or
(C) in any way reimburses or otherwise subsidizes its manufacturers for the
costs of such programs;
(4) alternative means by which any competitive advantage accruing to the
products of any foreign nation as a result of any factor described in paragraph
(3) may be (A) accurately and quickly determined, and (B) equalized, for
example, by the imposition of a surcharge or duty, on a foreign product in an
amount necessary to compensate for such advantage; and
(5) the impact, if any, which the imposition of a compensating tariff or other
equalizing measure may have in encouraging foreign nations to implement
pollution abatement and control programs.
(b) The Secretary shall make an initial report to the President and Congress within
six months after the date of enactment of this section of the results of the study and
investigation carried out pursuant to this section and shall make additional reports
thereafter at such times as he deems appropriate taking into account the develop-
merit of relevant data, but not less than once every twelve months.
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date the studies conducted pursuant to section 6 have fallen short of
this goal. The most recent study acknowledges -that "there are
virtually no reliable, comprehensive cost analyses in being which
can be directly used to answer the questions posed by Section 6." 25
Moreover, the study concedes, "no studies or approaches have yet
been identified that are directly useful in reaching confident conclu-
sions about pollution costs impacts on international trade." 26 The
lack of useful studies is due largely to two factors.
1. The accurate and consistent identification of fixed
and operating pollution control costs is the core of the
methodological difficulty, both from the viewpoint of
structuring the cost components themselves, and with re-
spect to the problems associated with collection of actual
plant data. For virtually all manufacturing industries,
wide variations exist in cost impacts related to pollution
controls as a result of plant-to-plant variations of such
factors as age of equipment; geographical location; and the
production processes, fuels, and materials employed. In
addition, determination of the full impact of pollution con-
trol costs for any product line involves an aggregation of
costs incurred by all suppliers of the end-product manufac-
turers. Similar plant-to-plant variations occur within these
supplier industries, thereby compounding the difficulty of
direct analysis and conclusions.
2. The pollution cost studies carried out by other or-
ganizations are invariably designed to serve purposes that
are substantially different from those set out in Section 6.
This is particularly true of cost studies carried out by
regulatory agencies which often seek to identify general
levels of aggregate costs which are not detailed enough to
allow conclusions about impacts on price and trade for
particular product lines. 27
The difficulties of data compilation with respect to foreign com-
petitors are even greater because, in addition to the foregoing prob-
lems, American researchers must deal with varying degrees of un-
cooperativeness and secretive attitudes as to what is conceived to be
proprietary and confidential business information.
One of the earliest efforts to quantify domestic environmental
costs on anything approaching a national basis consisted of a sum-
25
 II Pollution Abatement and International Trade, supra note 8, at 3.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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mary of eleven microeconomic studies prepared by private economic
consultant firms for the Council on Environmental Quality, the
Department of Commerce and the Environmental Protection
Agency, which was published as a joint-agency study in March of
1972. 28 The eleven studies, each of which focused upon a specific
industry, undertook to assess the cost of the air and water pollution
abatement requirements then in effect. In addition, this work con-
tained a macroeconomic study of the impact of air and water pollu-
tion control upon the economy in general, and upon international
trade and balance of payments in particular. One obvious weakness
of this study is its scope: it undertook to quantify only costs arising
from air and water pollution control and did not attempt to assess
costs arising from other types of environmental regulation.
Moreover, events subsequent to publication of the study have made
it clear that the 1972 forecasts of air and water pollution costs were
substantially understated: the enactment of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972 29 and the extensive promul-
gation of air and water quality regulations subsequent to March
1972 have produced and will continue to produce environmental
control costs many times greater than those originally forecast.
Since the publication of the joint-agency report various other
studies have been undertaken, and considerable effort is now being
made to structure methodologies that will produce the data required
to organize a study that adequately addresses the questions raised by
Congress. One such study is that of the Social and Environmental
Statistics Administration (SESA) of the Department of Commerce.
The objective of the SESA program is to devise a conceptual
framework for a full-scale pollution abatement expenditures survey.
The initial phase will undertake to quantify capital expenditures
and operating costs for abatement of air and water pollution and
solid waste disposal." The basic technique will be a skillfully struc-
tured pilot survey which will be sent to approximately 1100 estab-
lishments falling within 12 or 14 standard industrial classifications.
The data garnered from the pilot program will be factored into a
more comprehensive survey covering a minimum of 15,000 estab-
lishments representing 20 standard industrial classifications. This
broad survey effort will be supplemented by two more specialized
and detailed surveys: one covering 17,000 mineral producing and
manufacturing establishments that consume more than 20 million
28 Council on Environmental Quality, Dept of Commerce, and Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, The Economic Impact of Pollution Control: A Summary of Recent Studies
(1972).
29 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Sum), III, 1973).
30 II Pollution Abatement and International Trade, supra note 8, at 7-8.
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gallons of oil annually; the other an attempt to derive data on a
company rather than industry basis. 3 I
Pursuant to section 6(a)(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972, 32 the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has contracted for a series of studies to develop cost
data to determine the availability and achievability of pollution
control systems for 27 industrial categories by July i, 1977 and July
1983, respectively. The EPA project involves both technical and
economic analysis. The technical analysis will determine what con-
trol systems will be necessary to comply with effluent guidelines and
the economic analysis will quantify the capital investment and
operating costs of such technology. While this study addresses itself
to only part of the environmental cost problem, the methodological
and data developments• that result from the study may be useful in
other more comprehensive surveys. 33
The foregoing studies and reports represent important first
steps in developing an adequate data base and methodology with
which to fashion a meaningful response to the investigation called
for by Congress. However, it must be recognized that even if these
domestic data gathering methods and analyses are complete and
accurate, the more difficult portions of the study remain: (1) the
collection of comparable data from all relevant trade partners; 34 (2)
determination of the actual effects upon U.S. imports and exports to
be expected from various cost impact differentials on a product-by-
product as well as on an overall basis. This determination consti-
tutes the penultimate purpose of the study mandated by Congress.
However, it will not be possible to fulfill that purpose until the data
from trade partners becomes available.
It was recognized in 1971 that environmental costs would have
a substantial impact upon our international trade and investment
relations. The studies submitted to the Commission on Internatiorial
Trade and Investment Policy (CITIP) contain an analysis entitled
"International Economic Implications of Environmental Control
and Pollution Abatement Programs." 35 This study was completed in
July of 1971, and concluded that if the United States imposed strict
anti-pollution measures upon domestic industry, either by direct
31 Id.
32 Codified in a note following 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II, 1972). For text of § 6(a)(1),
see note 24 supra.
33 11 Pollution Abatement and International Trade, supra note 8, at 8-10.
34
 The Commerce Department has begun to analyze data with respect to the pollution
control programs of nine other industrialized nations: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. See I Pollution Abatement and
International Trade, supra note 8, at 20 and Appendices A-1 to A-84.
35 1 CITIP Study, supra note 17, at 777-90.
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regulation or by a taxing scheme; United States export and import-
competing industries would be placed at a competitive disadvantage
in both world and domestic markets. 36 Furthermore, it pointed out
that the United States trade balance and level of national income
would thereby be adversely affected: unless countervailing or com-
pensatory measures were adopted, a policy of strict environmental
regulation would encourage the outflow of investment funds to
foreign production sites. This outflow would be likely to worsen the
balance of payments deficits and to affect domestic growth rates
and employment adversely. 37 Another obvious result would be a
significant decline in the United States' share of many world
markets." The United States would thus aggravate an already
pronounced trend of pricing domestic industry out of important
world markets and of making domestic markets more vulnerable to
competition by imports.
The 1971 CITIP study recommended that the Committee on
Environment, an organ of the United Nations Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, be delegated the task of
devising an international agreement under which the industrial na-
tions would adopt "pollution control measures which incorporate
costs in price,"39 by which it is apparently meant that nations would
agree to quantify environmental costs and seek to incorporate that
increment representing environmental cost into final commodity
pricing. To date this international agreement has not been reached.
Even if such an agreement is reached and implemented, the CITIP
study acknowledged that specific United States export- and import-
competing industries might still be seriously affected, in which event
it concludes that adjustment assistance similar to that provided by
the 1962 Trade Expansion Act would be the best available rem-
edy. ao
Thus, until an effective and reliable international reporting
system can be established and, equally important, until an interna-
tional regulatory structure can be created to formulate equalization
measures appropriate to correct an improper competitive advantage
arising from inequalities of environmental protection costs, it will
probably not be possible to achieve fully the objective of Congress to
be able to "accurately and quickly determine" 41 if an improper
36
 Id. at 787.
37
 Id. at 784.
38 Id.
39
 Id. at 787.
4° Id. at 788. For a discussion of the adjustment assistance remedy for trade distortions,
see text at notes 59-82 infra.
41
 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 6(a)(4)(A), codified in
note following 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II, 1972).
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competitive advantage, as defined in section 6(a)(3) of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 42 is occurring,
and if so, to equalize the situation by appropriate countermeasures.
Since potent economic forces make immediate responses to the
problem essential, this delay in securing the data necessary to for-
mulate equalization measures is intolerable. It should be evident
from the analysis of the recent economic trends that it is not feasible
to postpone the United States' response to distortions arising from
unequal incurrence of environmental protection costs for the decade
or more that would probably be required to perfect such interna-
tional arrangements.
B. Costs of Environmental Regulation
Despite the lack of comprehensive data sufficient to quantify
the full extent of the impact of pollution abatement and other
environmental protection costs on the United States balance of trade
and payments, significant evidence suggests that the impact of these
distortions is substantial and possibly critical to the national
economic welfare. These environmental control cost distortions take
a variety of forms. It has already been noted that United States
energy demands upon foreign sources have had and will continue to
have major impact on the United States balance of trade and
payments and that environmental constraints on domestic oil and
gas production and refinement substantially increase United States
dependence on foreign sources at a time when costs are increasing
exponentially. 43 The precise extent to which United States environ-
mental regulations contribute to the outflow of capital may be
unknown, but it is widely recognized that the outflow of capital
exerts an adverse influence both upon the balance of trade and
payments and upon the level of employment in the United States.
A further adverse economic impact results from the fact that
existing environmental laws and regulations force domestic produc-
ers to allocate scarce capital to pollution abatement technology
rather than to productive capacity. A recent study shows that be-
cause of the cost of compliance with environmental laws, the pulp
and paper, iron and steel, and non-ferrous metals industries will
suffer significant additional import penetration, with the concomi-
tant adverse effects upon the United States trade position. 44 For
example, the investment required of the iron and steel industry to
finance necessary environmental controls would be sufficient to in-
42 See note following 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 11, 1972). For text of § 6, see note 24
supra.
43 See text at notes 10-16 supra.
" II Pollution Abatement and International Trade, supra note 8, at 14.
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crease its productive capacity to a level of 10-11 million product tons
by 1978. 45 Since this investment, under current environmental laws
and regulations, must be allocated to abatement technology, there
will be no such increase in capacity. Thus, increased domestic
demand for steel will have to be met by imports, causing an import
penetration that might not result without the cost of compliance
with environmental regulations. 46 The foregoing problems stem-
ming from domestic environmental regulation are not themselves
susceptible to easy solutions by changes in United States trade
policy. 47 Yet the existence of these stresses on the national economy
increases the need for effective strategies to counteract competitive
irregularities arising from environmental cost advantages enjoyed by
various United States trade partners.
A recent industry "disaggregation study" provides a reasonably
complete indication of the net impact upon United States export-
and import-competing industries of meeting environmental abate-
ment costs, relative to the effective protection now offered United
States import-competing industries under present tariff levels. 48
This scholarly study estimated environmental costs for each of a
number of specific commodities, including capital and depreciation
costs for abatement technology, operating costs, and research and
development expenditures. These pollution control cost estimates
were then articulated into the total process of manufacturing the
final product expressed as a ratio of cost to dollar volume of sales. 49
In order to form a basis for determining competitive impact, it is
necessary to equate these costs to the "effective tariff protection"
now afforded these commodities. 5° Using the weighted average of
total environmental costs protection as a percent of value added for
the selected industries, the study shows that the environmental costs
comprise four percent of total value, which in turn represents
twenty-seven percent of the total effective rate of protection af-
forded these commodities under existing tariffs and quantifiable
non-tariff barriers. 5 ' The study demonstrates that more than one-
45 Id.
44 Id.
47 U.S. domestic policy may be changed more easily. The current national attention
given to controlling inflation and improving the posture of the United States in international
trade may result in legislative and executive review of existing environmental laws to deter-
mine whether the economic and inflationary impacts outweigh their benefits or whether more
cost-effective strategies can be substituted.
48 Walter, The Pollution Content of American Trade, 11 West. Econ. J. 61 (1973).
49 Id .
50 "Effective tariff protection" includes not merely stated or nominal tariff levels but also
quantifiable non-tariff barriers such as quotas.
52 Walter, supra note 46, at 61. See also II Pollution Abatement and International
Trade, supra note 8, at 58.
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fourth of the effective protection Congress intended to accord the
selected industries has in fact been eroded by environmental costs. 52
Thus it is evident that meaningful congressional consideration
of trade reform legislation must take into account a series of unpre-
cedented economic forces affecting this nation's world trade posi-
tion: (1) spiralling inflationary costs on a scale never before experi-
enced in this country during this century; (2) significantly declining
worker productivity; (3) continued deterioration in balance of trade
and payments; (4) substantial and continuing budget deficits; (5)
major impacts on the relative exchange value of our currency; (6) a
massive and increasing import requirement of increasingly expen-
sive foreign oil; (7) as yet uncalculated, but concededly substantial
environmental costs which promise to price products manufactured
domestically further out of the market. Both houses of Congress
considered different strategies and institutional solutions to cope
with these conditions. 53 Congressional consideration resulted in the
enactment of the Trade Act of 1974.
IV. TRADE ACT OF 1974: THE CURRENT DECISION-MAKING
STRUCTURE FOR COUNTERACTING DISTORTIONS
The adverse impacts upon United States trade arising from
distortions resulting from the unequal incurrence of environmental
control costs between one or more United States trade partners and
United States producers result from two specific causes. The first
and most obvious cause is the significant increase of imports into the
United States due to the advantages gained by a foreign competitor
who incurs lower environmental control costs. In such instances
import relief for domestic producers is the appropriate remedy. Title
II of the Trade Act of 1974 54 establishes the decision-making
mechanism for provision of this relief., The other specific cause of
adverse effects upon United States trade from environmental cost
distortions is the use of various "unfair" trade practices by a foreign
trade partner. Two examples of these trade practices are foreign
governmental subsidies to offset environmental control costs and
governmental exemptions from environmental control requirements.
In such instances the remedy afforded domestic producers is relief
from these trade practices. Title HI of the Trade Act of 1974 55
provides these remedies.
For purposes of analysis of the provisions of the Trade Act of
1974, it is assumed that no international regulatory apparatus
52
 Walter, supra note 46, at 61.
53 See generally S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
54 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2011-41.
ss Id., 88 Stat. 2041-56.
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adequate to cope with inequalities in environmental control costs
will be forthcoming in the foreseeable future and that the United
States will therefore be obliged to develop unilateral strategies to
cope with this problem. Moreover, this analysis will not discuss the
question of which unilateral measures constitute the most appro-
priate remedies for such distortions. 56 Instead, this analysis will
focus on the issue of what trade decision-making structure would
best enable the United States to respond effectively to such distor-
tions in order to protect vulnerable sectors of domestic industry and
to improve the overall balance of trade and payments position of the
United States.
A. Import Relief Provisions
Where a domestic producer is either threatened with serious
injury or is actually injured by increased imports arising from the
price advantages gained by foreign producers as a result of lower
environmental control costs, one possible remedy is the granting of
import relief. Import relief may take the form of offsetting duty
increases, tariff-rate quotas, quantitative restrictions, or use of or-
derly marketing agreements. This analysis will not consider which
specific type of import relief may be the most appropriate remedy in
a particular situation. Instead, in discussing the Trade Act of 1974,
it will focus on what institutional decision-making structure is best
suited to determine when import relief is warranted.
The Trade Act of 1974 makes major changes in the import
relief apparatus established by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
(1962 Act). Under the 1962 Act, as construed by the United States
Tariff Commission, 57 there were four prerequisites to an affirmative
finding with respect to an industry, on the basis of which finding the
President could proclaim "such increase in, or imposition of, any
duty or other import restriction on the article causing or threatening
to cause serious injury to such industry as he determines to be
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury to such industry."58
These prerequisites were: (1) imports of an article similar to or
competitive with one produced by the domestic industry must be
increasing; (2) the increased imports must be in major part the result
of trade agreement concessions; (3) the domestic industry producing
56
 For an analysis of the various options available to counteract environmental cost
distortions, see Kirgis, Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries; International
Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the GATT, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 860 (1972). See
also Dep't of Treasury, GATT Studies in International Trade, No. 1, Industrial Pollution
Control and International Trade (1971).
57
 U.S. Tariff Comm'n, Nonrubber Footwear 6 (No. 359, Jan. 1971), noted in Recent
Decisions, 7 Texas Intl L.J. 163 (1971).
511
 19 U.S.C.
	
1981(a)(1) (1970).
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the like or competitive article must be suffering serious injury; and
(4) the increased imports ,must be the major factor in causing or
threatening to cause serious injury. 59
In addition to import relief for an industry, the 1962 Act
authorized both firms and groups of workers to petition for adjust-
ment assistance." To qualify for such individual relief, petitioners
had to meet the same four prerequisites. 6 ' At the outset, little relief
was obtained under these provisions. During the first seven years
under the 1962 Act, no relief was granted either to a firm or to a
group of workers. In 1969, the Tariff Commission granted relief to
two workers' groups in the form of adjustment assistance. 62 There-
after, as of April 1972, relief was granted in response to 39 petitions
from groups of workers and 11 petitions from firms." Relief to an
industry has been rare."
The 1974 Act will most likely facilitate the provision of import
relief to firms and groups of workers. Unlike the 1962 Act, under
the Trade Act of 1974 no causal link to trade concessions is required
for relief. 65
 Secondly, the criteria as to the extent to which imports
must have contributed to the injury to an industry, firms or workers
have been relaxed by the 1974 Act. Under the 1974 Act there are
two different criteria: (1) for industry, a Trade Commission 66 finding
is required that increased imports are or threaten to become a
substantial cause of serious injury, 67 a term defined by the Act to
mean a cause that is "not less than any other cause;" 68 and (2) for
workers, the Secretary of Labor must find that a significant number
or proportion of workers have become totally or partially separated,
that sales or production have decreased absolutely and that in-
creased imports contributed importantly to the decline in sales or
production and to the separation of workers." For individual firms,
the Secretary of Commerce must make the same findings as those
59 U.S. Tariff Comm'n, Nonrubber Footwear 6 (No. 359, Jan. 1971). See note 57 supra.
" 19 U.S.C. §§ 1 90 1 (C)( 1), (2), (3) (1970).
61 See id.
62
 U.S. Tariff Comm'n, Buttweld Pipe (No. 297, Nov. 1969); U.S Tariff Comm'n,
Transmission Towers & Parts (No. 298, Nov. 1969).
63 See Fulda, Adjustment to Hardship Caused by Imports: The New Decisions of the
Tariff Commission and the Need for Legislative Clarification, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 791, 800
(1972).
64 For a detailed analysis of the Tariff Commission's interpretation of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962, see id.
65 Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 88 Stat. 2011.
66
 Trade Act of 1974, § 171, 88 Stat. 2009, amending 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1970). This
section changed the name of the United States Tariff Commission to the United States
International Trade Commission.
67 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(1), 88 Stat. 2012.
" Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(4), 88 Stat. 2012.
69
 Trade Act of 1974, § 222, 88 Stat. 2019.
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required for relief of worker injury." The term "contributed impor-
tantly" is defined as "a cause which is important but not necessarily
more important than any other cause." 7 '
Under the 1962 Act, the predecessor of the Trade Commission
would institute an investigation upon the filing of an import relief
petition by industry or labor groups, by the Senate Committee on
Finance, by the House Ways and Means Committee, by the Presi-
dent or upon the initiative of the Commission itself. 72 This com-
plaint procedure is continued under the new law, and in addition
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 73 is also au-
thorized to petition for import relief."
Determination of whether increased imports are in fact a sub-
stantial cause of serious injury is based upon the satisfaction of three
specific economic conditions: (1), significant idling of productive
facilities; (2) inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a
reasonable level of profit; and (3) significant unemployment or
underemployment within the industry. 75 With respect to the threat
of serious injury the Commission is required to consider whether
there has been: (1) a decline in sales; (2) a higher and growing
inventory; and (3) a downward trend in production, profits, wages,
or employment in the domestic industry concerned. 76 With respect
to substantial cause, the Trade Commission must take into account
whether there has been: (1) an increase in imports (either absolute or
relative to domestic production); and (2) a decline in the proportion
of the domestic market supplied by domestic producers. 77 New
provisions, in the "escape clause" section of the 1974 Act require the
Trade Commission to investigate and report on efforts by firms and
workers in the industry to compete more effectively with imports"
and to determine whether or not increased imports may be attribut-
able to problems solved by resort to the remedial provisions of the
Antidumping Act of 1921, 79
 the countervailing duty law, or under
7° Trade Act of 1974, § 251(c), 88 Stat. 2030.
71
 Trade Act of 1974, §§ 222, 251(c), 88 Stat. 2019, 2030.
72 19 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(1) (1970).
73 The Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations is established by
§ 141(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1999. The Special Representative is appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. The Special Representative is the
successor to the identically-named office created pursuant to Executive Order No. 11075, 28
Fed. Reg. 473 (Jan. 15, 1963).
74
 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(1), 88 Stat. 2012.
75
 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(2)(A), 88 Stat. 2012,
76
 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(2)(11), 88 Stat. 2012.
77
 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(2)(C), 88 Stat. 2012.
78
 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(5), 88 Stat. 2012.
79
 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1970). The Antidumping Act of 1921 empowers the Secretary of
the Treasury to take certain ameliorative steps whenever there is a finding that a domestic
industry is being, or is likely to be injured, by the sale of foreign merchandise at less than its
fair value either in the United States or elsewhere. Id. §* 160-61.
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those other remedial provisions of the 1974 Act dealing with unfair
trade practices. 8 ° In the last case the agencies which administer the
relevant provisions of law are to be notified. If the Trade Commis-
sion does find that a serious injury or threat of serious injury exists,
it must include in its report the amount of duty increase or imposi-
tion of other import restrictions necessary to prevent or remedy such
inj ury. 81 Alternatively, if it finds that adjustment assistance for a
workers' group, a firm or a community can remedy the injury, it
must recommend the provision of such assistance. 82
The critical question arising in appeals for relief under the
Trade Act of 1974 is what presidential action is taken after the
Trade Commission has concluded its investigation and made an
affirmative finding. Under the 1974 Act, upon receiving an affirma-
tive finding of injury from the Trade Commission, the President: (I)
must consider the extent to which adjustment assistance has been or
could be made available; 83 and (2) may decide to provide import
relief." The President is then required to make his decision within
60 days after receiving the Trade Commission report. 85 In deciding
whether or not to provide import relief, the President is required to
take into consideration several factors: (1) the probable effectiveness
of import relief as a means to promote adjustment; (2) the effect of
import relief upon consumers; (3) the impact upon domestic indus-
tries and firms of any possible modification of import restrictions
which may result from international obligations to provide compen-
sation; 86 and (4) the economic and social costs which would be
incurred by taxpayers, communities, and workers, if import relief
were or were not provided. 87
The 1974 Act authorizes the President to impose one or more of
the following import relief measures: duty increases; tariff-rate
quotas; quantitative restrictions; orderly marketing agreements; or
any combination of such actions. 88 Whenever the President selects a
particular measure or measures to provide import relief, he is re-
8 ° Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(6), 88 Stat. 2013.
81
 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(d)(1)(A), 88 Stat. 2013,
82
 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(d)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 2013.
83 Trade Act of 1974, § 202(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 2014.
64
 Trade Act of 1974, § 202(a)(1)(A), 88 Stat. 2014.
85
 Trade Act of 1974, § 202(b), 88 Stat. 2014.
86
 The industries and firms referred to here should not be confused with industries and
firms that might petition for import relief under Title II of the Act, 88 Stat. 2011; rather, they
are industries and firms that might be affected by presidential action under § 123 of the Act,
88 Stat. 1989, which provides that whenever any action is taken under § 203, 88 Stat. 2015,
the President may enter into trade agreements with foreign governments for the purpose of
granting new concessions as compensation for such actions in order to maintain the general
level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions.
87 Trade Act of 1974, § 202(c), 88 Stat. 2014.
88 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(a), 88 Stat. 2015.
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quired to report his action to Congress." If the action taken by the
President differs from the recommendation of the Trade Commis-
sion, he must state the reason for the difference. 9° If he determines ,
that the provision of import relief is not in the national economic
interest, he must state the reasons why, as well as indicate what
steps he is taking, other than adjustment assistance programs, to
repair the serious injury found by the Commission. 9 '
If the President determines that import relief is appropriate, he
must proclaim the award of such relief and require that it take effect
within 15 days of his determination. 92 However, if on the date of his
determination he announces his intention to negotiate an orderly
marketing agreement under sections 203(a)(4) or (5) of the 1974
Act, 93
 then such relief must be proclaimed and take effect within 90
days of the determination date." In addition, if the initial form of
relief proclaimed does not include an orderly marketing agreement,
such an agreement may thereafter be negotiated with a foreign
government; and after such an agreement takes effect, the President
may suspend or terminate, in whole or in part, the initial form of
relief granted. 95
If the President reports to Congress that he has determined not
to provide import relief despite an affirmative determination by the
Trade Commission under section 201(b), 96 or that he is granting
relief that is different from that recommended by the Commission,
Congress may override the President's determination and give effect
to the Commission's recommendation by a simple majority vote
taken within ninety days of the President's report to Congress. 97
B9
 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(b), 88 Stat. 2015.
99
 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(b)(1), 88 Stat. 2015.
91 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(b)(2), 88 Stat. 2015.
92 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(e)(1), 88 Stat. 2016.
93 88 Stat. 2015.
94 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(e)(1), 88 Stat. 2016. For purposes of the proclamation of
relief, the "import relief determination date" is the date of the President's determination under
§ 202(b), 88 Stat. 2014.
95 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(e)(2), 88 Stat. 2016. If, at any time an orderly marketing
agreement does not continue to be effective, the President may grant other forms of import
relief so long as the time limitations of § 203(h), 88 Stat. 2017, are not exceeded, Id. §
203(e)(3), 88 Stat. 2016.
96 88 Stat. 2012.
91 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(c), 88 Stat. 2016. This is the procedure which was proposed
by the Senate Finance Committee, with a slight modification. Under the original Senate
version of the Act the President had no discretion to withhold relief in the face of an
affirmative determination by the Commission under § 201(b): he would have been required to
take some form of positive action. If he opted for a form of relief that differed from that
recommended by the Commission, Congress could compel adoption of the Commission's
recommendation by simple majority vote. See S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 213 Sess. 84
(1974). The original House version would not have required the President to take positive
action whenever there was a finding of serious injury by the Commission, and Congress
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The provision for congressional override of a presidential determina-
tion regarding import relief is a significant departure from the prior
congressional practice of delegating to the President nearly absolute
discretion over such matters. Along with other provisions of the
Trade Act of 1974, 98 it reflects a gain of power by the Trade
Commission at the expense of the President, by virtue of the con-
gressional retention of supervisory powers which, when affirma-
tively exercised, give legal effect to the Commission's recommenda-
tions.
Furthermore, while Congress has expanded its own supervisory
role, it also has ensured that its actions would be well-informed.
The Act increases from two to five the number of congressional
advisors to be appointed from each house to oversee international
trade negotiations. The Senate Finance Committee and the House
Ways and Means Committee are to nominate the advisors from
among their own respective members, and the nominees are to be
appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House. 99 In addition, the Act requires that the
Private Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, a committee
chaired by the Special Trade Representative and composed of 45
representatives of government, labor, industry, agriculture, con-
sumer interests and the general public, 100 be given full access to all
data concerning negotiating objectives and the progress of negotia-
would not have had the authority to override that decision not to act. See Senate Comm. on
Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Summary and Analysis of H.R. 10710—The Trade Reform Act
of 1973, at 33 (1974). However, the House version provided that, if the President ordered
import relief in the form of either orderly marketing agreements or quantitative restrictions,
such relief would cease to be effective if, within 90 days from the submission of the
proclamation of such measures to the Congress, either the House or the Senate adopted a
resolution of disapproval. Id. at 37. The Senate also proposed that the total possible period of
effectiveness of any given import relief measure be extended from seven to eight years. The
proposal was adopted. See Trade Act of 1974, § 203(h), 88 Stat. 2017.
" Section 172(a) of the Act, 88 Stat. 2009, extends the term of office of the Commission-
ers from six to nine years and provides for appointment of the chairman and vice-chairman on
the basis of seniority rather than by presidential designation. Section 175(a), 88 Stat. 2011,
increases slightly the compensation of each member of the Commission and, more important-
ly, provides that the budget of the Commission is to be approved directly by Congress rather
than by the office of Management and Budget, an arm of the executive branch. Section 174,
88 Stat. 2011 gives the Commission the authority to hire its own attorneys and to represent
itself in all judicial proceedings. Under prior law, the Commission was required to request the
Justice Department for such assistance.
All of these changes came at the insistence of the Senate Finance Committee which, if its
version had fully prevailed over that of the House, would have strengthened the independence
of the Committee even more. Specifically, the Finance Committee would have extended the
term of each Commissioner to fourteen years; enlarged the membership to seven; and pro-
vided for the appointment of the chairman and vice-chairman by a majority vote of the
Commission. See S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974).
99
 Trade Act of 1974, § 16I(a), 88 Stat. 2008.
'°° Trade Act of 1974, § 135(b), 88 Stat. 1996.
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lions."' The Act further requires that the committee issue formal
advisory opinions to Congress indicating whether pending trade
agreements would achieve equity and reciprocity. 102
The contrast between the original House version of the Trade
Act of 1974 and the version ultimately passed by Congress high-
lights the question of what is the best way to organize trade policy
decision-making. The original House version 103 would have left
unchanged the nature of Trade Commission proceedings under the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Part 206 of the Commission's
regulations. 104
 Essentially, these proceedings were investigatory and
fact-finding only; since the President retained absolute discretion to
accept or reject recommendations based on facts found by the
Commission, the Commission lacked effective power. The Senate
Finance Committee, by virtue of an amendment that would have
required the President to grant some form of import relief whenever
the Commission made an affirmative finding of injury under section
201(b)(1), 105 would have completely reversed this situation. 106 Even
though the Trade Act does not go that far, it nevertheless represents
a significant and desirable reallocation of decision-making power in
an area that is politically sensitive.
It has long been recognized that important advantages derive
from congressional delegation of regulatory power to specialized
agencies which can provide a continuity of surveillance and exper-
tise over complex economic matters and that these advantages are
normally unavailable in the three constitutional branches of gov-
ernment.'" Traditionally, administrative agencies have been given
rule-making, quasi-judicial and executive powers, with judicial re-
view operating as a check on the lawfulness and reasonableness of
agency decisions. To delegate authority to a specialized, expert
commission to evaluate complex trade issues and to reach detailed
conclusions and to omit to provide the means to implement these
findings and conclusions, and instead to allow either inaction or
totally different relief, would be anomalous and unsound.
Prior to the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974 there were only
101
 Trade Act of 1974, § 135(i), 88 Stat. 1998.
102 Trade Act of 1974, § 135(e), 88 Stat. 1997.
1 °3 See Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Summary and Analysis of H.R.
10710--The Trade Reform Act of 1973, at 31 (1974).
I " 19 C.F.R. § 206 (1974).
1 ° 5 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b){1), 88 Stat. 2012.
1 ° 6 Under the Senate version the President could have granted a form of relief different
from that recommended by the Commission, although even this limited grant of discretion
would have been subject to a congressional override. See S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 83-87 (1974).
107 See, e.g., J. Landis, The Administrative Process 6-46 (1938).
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two situations in which the President could circumvent the findings
and decision of an independent administrative agency. One of these
has now been partially corrected by the new Trade Act through
congressional reservation of certain supervisory powers.'" The
other is the power of the President under section 801 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 109
 to substitute his decision for that of the Civil
Aeronautics Board, arrived at after the holding of adjudicatory
hearings, to award territorial, overseas and international air carrier
Ipermits. n both instances judicial review is precluded. The Senate
has severely criticized the power of the President to overrule inde-
pendent agency decisions on air transportation:
The practical result of this total shifting of authority has
been to subject the President directly to all the burdens
and pressures of air commerce regulation. Thus, he is
called upon in every section 801 case to pass final judg-
ment on the fitness, willingness, and ability of air carriers
to perform the service in question—these being the funda-
mental statutory criteria for the issuance of any certificate.
In the great majority of instances, _including those covered
by section 801, the decision called for must be based en-
tirely on economic or technical considerations having no
practical bearing whatsoever on national defense policy or
the conduct of foreign relations. . . . Matters of an
economic or regulatory nature which the Board, acting
under the aegis of the Congress, is alone competent to
decide and for which it alone is adequately staffed and
ordered have somehow unwittingly become delegated to
the Executive.' 10
It is equally anomalous to empower the President to ignore and,
in effect, to veto a considered agency decision that import relief is
required; such a process violates basic principles of sound
decision-making. Moreover, such an apparatus endangers the credi-
bility of government. Presidential use of section 801 powers in
198
 See text at notes 85-92 supra.
109
 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
' 1 ° Senate Commerce Comm., Improvement of Procedures for the Development of
Foreign Air Commerce, S. Rep. No. 119, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957).
Senate Bill 1423 in the 85th Congress would have amended section 801, 49 U.S.C. § 1461
(1970), inter alia, "by restricting the President's power to overrule CAB certification actions to
foreign air transportation cases involving national defense or foreign policy" and by requiring
the President "to submit to Congress a report of any instance in which he overrules a Board
order as contrary to the interests of defense or foreign policy." S. 1423 passed the Senate, 104
Cong. Rec. 5137 (1957), but was not acted upon by the House.
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aviation cases has occasioned accusations of improprieties."' Simi-
larly, presidential discretion to award import relief was recently
criticized on the ground that "the White House treated the matter
`as a political football.' " 112
 This criticism of the potential for abuse
does not apply to any particular President. These problems of the
credibility and integrity of the decision-fnaking process arise from an
unsound executive-legislative-administrative relationship and have
occurred in prior presidential administrations and would likely have
continued in future administrations had Congress not enacted these
provisions of the 1974 Act.
B. "Unfair" Trade Practices Provisions
Whereas Title II of the Trade Act of 1974 13 deals with means
of providing relief from injury caused by "fair" but injurious import
competition, Title III 114
 deals with "unfair" and "illegal" trade
practices affecting United States exports or foreign imports into the
United States. Distortions arising from inequalities in environmental
control costs can manifest themselves in the form of foreign sub-
sidies, exemptions from environmental regulations as to selected
industries competing in international trade markets, or other trade
practices.
The 1974 Trade Act broadens existing authority to retaliate
against "unreasonable" or "unjustifiable" foreign import restrictions
adversely affecting United States exports.'" However, this author-
ity continues to be a wholly discretionary one in the hands of the
President. The Trade Act provides no complaint procedure to force
a decision on any unfair foreign trade practice of foreign govern-
ments described in section 301. 116 Section 301(a) authorizes the
111 See Markham, Two Proposals for Amendment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
35 J. Air. L. & Com. 591, 597 (1969); Whitney, Integrity of Agency Judicial Process Under the
Federal Aviation Act: The Special Problem Posed by International Airline Route Awards, 14
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 787 (1973); Note, Section 801 of the Federal Aviation Act—The
President and the Award of International Air Routes to Domestic Carriers: A Proposal for
Change, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev, 517 (1970).
" 2
 81 American Metal Market, Apr. 1, 1974, at 27.
113 88 Stat. 2011.
114
 88 Stat. 2041.
us Trade Act of 1974, §§ 301-41, 88 Stat. 2041-56.
116 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(d)(2), 88 Stat. 2042, does provide that, upon the filing of a
complaint by an interested party alleging restrictive practices by a foreign government, the
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations is required to conduct public hearings and to
submit to Congress semiannual summaries of such complaints and hearings. This subsection,
however, does not require the President to take notice of such complaints. Section 301(e), 88
Stat. 2042, requires the President to provide an opportunity for the presentation of views
before taking any action under * 301(a), 88 Stat. 2041, However, the same subsection also
allows the President to postpone such presentations until after he has acted, if he determines
that the "national interest" calls for expeditious action.
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President to suspend concessionary treatment for, and to impose
duties or other import restrictions on, the imports of any foreign
country which, inter alia, discriminates or permits "acts or policies
which are unjustifiable or unreasonable and which burden or re-
strict United States commerce."'" The President also is given au-
thority to act against countries which provide subsidies on exports to
the United States or to other foreign markets having the effect of
substantially reducing sales of competitive United States products in
the United States or elsewhere. 118 However, in the latter situation
the President can act only if: (1) the Secretary of the Treasury finds
that the foreign country does provide subsidies; (2) the Trade Com-
mission finds that the subsidized imports in fact reduce sales of
competitive United States products; and (3) the President finds that
the Antidumping Act of 1921," 9 and the countervailing duty law"°
are inadequate to deter such practices.' 2 i
In acting under the authority of section 301, the President is
required to consider the relationship of such action to the interna-
tional obligations of the United States. 122 Actions may be under-
taken on a nondiscriminatory treatment basis, i.e., most favored
nation basis; or the President may act selectively with respect to
specific countries which maintain unreasonable or unjustifiable re-
strictions. ' 23
Section 302 of the 1974 Act 124 subjects any presidential action
taken under section 301 on a nondiscriminatory treatment basis to a
quasi-veto by Congress. If, before the close of the 90-day period
following receipt of the presidential decision setting forth such ac-
tion, both the Senate and the House, by an affirmative vote of a
majority of those present and voting, adopt a resolution of disap-
proval with respect to such action, then the presidential action has
no effect except with respect to the country whose restrictive acts or
policies caused the taking of the presidential action in the first
place. 125 In contrast to its proposals with respect to a grant of
117 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(a)(2), 88 Stat. 2041.
118
 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(a)(3), 88 Stat. 2041. The President may also act whenever
he determines that a foreign country: (1) maintains unjustifiable or unreasonable import
restrictions which impair the value of the trade commitments made to the United States or
which discriminate against United States commerce; (2) imposes unjustifiable or unreasonable
restrictions on access to supplies of foods, raw materials or manufactured produCts which
burden or restrict United States commerce. Id. §§ 301(a)(1), (4), 88 Stat. 2041.
119 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1970).
12° 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
121 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(c), 88 Stat. 2042.
122
 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(b), 88 Stat. 2042.
123 Id.
124
 88 Stat. 2043.
I2S Id .
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import relief, the Senate Finance Committee did not undertake to
narrow or eliminate the virtually unchecked discretion of the Presi-
dent, as reflected in the original House bill, to retaliate against
unreasonable or unjustifiable trade practices of foreign trade
partners. The Committee did agree that the power of the President
to retaliate against such acts should be explicitly extended to cover
acts which affect "services" as well as goods,' 26 thereby bringing
under a protective umbrella shipping, aviation, insurance, and
banking activities.' 27
The countervailing duty is one of the most direct responses avail-
able to retaliate against a grant, bounty or subsidy accorded a
foreign industry by its government in the form of an exemption from
environmental control costs. Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 128
requires the Secretary of the Treasury to impose countervailing
duties upon imported merchandise whose manufacture, production,
or export has been aided directly or indirectly by a bounty or grant
(i.e., subsidy). Section 331 of the Trade Act of 1974' 29 makes major
procedural as well as substantive changes in the Tariff Act counter-
vailing duty law. Under new subsection (a) of section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930' 3 ° the Secretary of the Treasury is now required
to initiate a formal investigation to determine whether there exists a
bounty or grant; the determination must be made within 12 months
after the date on which the contention was first presented to the
Secretary. 13 ' Under prior law there was no prescribed time within
which a determination had to be made.' 32 After an affirmative final
determination by the Secretary under new subsection (a), any coun-
tervailing duties imposed must apply to any merchandise entered, or
withdrawn from a warehouse, for consumption on or after the date
of the publication of such determination in the Federal Register. 133 .
Moreover, under new subsection (b) of section 303 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, the reach of the countervailing duties law is extended to
cover non-dutiable iteirns. 134 However, to the extent that the inter-
national obligations of the United States so require, countervailing
duties may not be imposed on non-dutiable items unless there is an
affirmative determination by the Trade Commission that the impor-
125 See S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1974).
127 Trade Act of 1974, § 301(a), 88 Stat. 2041, defines the term "commerce" to include
"services associated with the international trade." Id.
128 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
124 88 Stat. 2049.
13° Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2049, adding 19 U.S,C. § 1303(a).
131 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2050, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(4).
132
 Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
133 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding . 19 U.S.C. § 1303(c).
' 34 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2050, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b),
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tation of the subsidized, non-dutiable merchandise is injuring, or
likely will injure or impede the establishment or maintenance of a
domestic industry.' 35 No such affirmative finding, of course, is ever
required with respect to dutiable items. If the Secretary makes a
determination that a bounty or grant exists with respect to a non-
dutiable import, and after the Trade Commission makes an affirma-
tive finding under section 303(b)(1)(A),' 36 the Secretary is authorized
to order the suspension of liquidation with respect to such merchan-
dise entered or withdrawn from warehouses on or after the day of
the publication of such determination in the Federal Register.'"
Thereafter, the Secretary may order the assessment of countervail-
ing duties as provided in'section 303(a).' 38
New subsection (d) of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930' 39
adds a whole new concept to the unfair foreign trade statutes.
During the four-year period following the enactment of the Trade
Act of 1974, the Secretary of the Treasury is granted discretionary
authority to refrain from imposing a countervailing duty after an
affirmative determination is made under section 303(a), if he deter-
mines that: (1) adequate steps have been taken to reduce or elimi-
nate the adverse effect of a bounty or grant;'" (2) there is reason to
believe that, under section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974, 14 ' success-
ful trade agreements will be negotiated with foreign countries which
provide for the reduction or elimination of barriers to or other
distortions of international trade;' 42 and (3) the imposition of a
countervailing duty would be likely to jeopardize the satisfactory
completion of such negotiations. 143
This grant of discretionary power is designed to implement a
congressional declaration favoring the establishment of international
agreements with respect to the use of export subsidies and the
application of countervailing duties.'" Nevertheless, the Secretary's
exercise of discretion under this subsection is subject to congres-
sional review and veto. Whenever the Secretary refrains from im-
posing countervailing duties pursuant to section 303(d), he must
report his decision, along with his reasons for it, to both houses of
Congress. 145
 At any time after such report, his decision may be
135
 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2050, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(1)(B).
136
 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2050, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(1)(A).
137
 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2050, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(1)(B).
138
 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat, 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2).
136 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d).
14° Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2)(A).
141
	88 Stat.	 1982.
147 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2)(B).
143
 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(2)(C).
1 " Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(1).
145
 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(e)(1).
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overridden by a simple majority resolution of disapproval by both
Houses, and the countervailing duty becomes effective im-
mediately. 146
Section 331(b) of the 1974 Trade Act amends section 516 of the
1930 Tariff Act' 47
 in such a way as to provide domestic manufac-
turers, producers, or wholesalers, the right to seek judicial review of
a negative countervailing duty determination by the Secretary of the
Treasury.'" Under prior law, judicial review was available only
after the Secretary had made an affirmative finding of bounty or
grant and had levied countervailing duties;i 49 such a review system
was only of benefit to importers and others adversely affected by the
imposition'of countervailing duties. The Trade Act of 1974 amends
section 516 of the 1930 Tariff Act so that domestic manufacturers,
producers and wholesalers can petition the Secretary of the Treasury
to reconsider his determination that countervailing duties should not
be levied in a particular case. There is no prescribed time within
which the Secretary must reach a decision on the merits of such a
petition; however, if the Secretary decides that his initial decision
denying imposition of a countervailing duty is correct, the petitioner
must notify the Secretary within 30 days of his intention to contest
the denial in Customs Court. 's°
V. CONCLUSION
Congress has recognized that far-reaching changes in the United
States and world economies require fundamental reevaluation
of the international trade policy that has prevailed over the last
several decades. For the first time the U.S. economy is beset by an
unprecedented combination of economic forces which should not be
allowed to continue. Various factors—continuing inflation, decline
in worker productivity, deteriorating balances of trade and pay-
ments, substantial and worsening budget deficits, persistent cur-
rency exchange crises, increasing dependence on foreign energy
sources and raw materials, chronic shortages of capital and unduly
high interest rates, new non-tariff international trade distortions
arising from unequal incidents of environmental control costs—all
create urgent pressures to devise adequate international trade reg-
ulatory mechanisms capable of coping with these problems.
146
 Trade Act of 1974, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 2051, adding 19 U.S.C. § 1303(e)(2).
147
 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970).
14 ' Trade Act of 1974, § 331(b), 88 Stat. 2052, amending 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970).
' 4 " 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1970).
Is° Trade Act of 1974, § 331(b), 88 Stat. 2052, amending 19 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (1970). A
party is permitted to contest a decision of the Secretary of the Treasury under § 516 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S,C. § 1516 (1970), by filing a civil action in Customs Court. 28
U.S.C. § 2632 (1970).
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With respect to import relief, the Trade Act of 1974 provides
several important improvements. Initially, the Act substantially re-
duces the burden of proof that industries, firms and groups of
workers must sustain in hearings before the Trade Commission.
Thus, the probability of import relief is substantially increased.
Moreover, once the Trade Commission makes an "affirmative
finding," the assurance that the President will take effective action
has been enhanced. Not only is the President's accountability to
Congress significantly expanded, but the time in which the President
must act is specified and expedited. Of perhaps equal significance,
the Act provides for congressional override of a presidential deter-
mination either to refuse import relief or to grant relief 'other than
that deemed appropriate by the Trade Commission. Finally, the Act
establishes procedures calculated to improve the quality of available
data upon which trade decision-making will be based.
As to unfair trade practices, the Trade Act of 1974, while
providing certain improvements, falls short of providing as effective
remedies as those provided for import relief. The most critical
shortcoming of the Act is its failure to provide a complete procedure
capable of forcing a decision on any unfair trade practice described
in section 301: the Act leaves to presidential discretion the decision
whether to retaliate against "unreasonable" or "unjustifiable"
foreign import restrictions affecting United States exports. It is
difficult to perceive a rationale for having one approach to import
relief and another for dealing with unfair trade practices.
On the positive side, the Act significantly enhances the effec-
tiveness of countervailing duties by requiring the Secretary of
Treasury to impose such duties in cases of foreign subsidies and by
requiring the Secretary's deliberative process to be completed within
twelve months of complaint. Similarly, review and veto by Congress
in cases where the Secretary, despite an "affirmative finding,"
nevertheless exercises his discretionary power to abstain from assess-
ing countervailing duties, is an important check upon executive
department discretion. Finally, the provision for judicial review in a
case where the Secretary makes a negative determination provides
further control over such discretion.
Since the legislative deliberations involved in the enactment of
the Trade Act of 1974 were substantial, it is likely that Congress
will not be inclined to undertake an early reassessment of this
legislation. However, the economic conditions that provided im-
petus for many of the innovations in the Trade Act continue to
worsen, and thereby intensify the pressures to create an optimal
international trade decision-making process. It is imperative that the
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Congress maintain a vigilant oversight of the effectiveness of the
processes devised by the Act. If the apparent limitations of the Act
become clear in light,of future events, Congress should act swiftly to
enact the necessary amendments.
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